I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last four and a half decades, automation and industrial control have been ever changing. At the beginning of industrial automation, hardwired connections between control units and sensors or actuators respectively lacked flexibility and adaptability. This led to the rise of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), allowing for a more versatile interconnection of production units. Today, the introduction of the Internet of Things (IoT) into production, the so-called Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT), is emerging. The goal is to increase flexibility and reduce set up and configuration times, as well as to decrease cost and effort needed. Interconnectivity of devices among different network areas is part of this change of paradigm, as well as connectivity through trust boundaries and over public internet. With all the benefits arising from the IIoT, however, risks are evolving as well. Over the last two decades, an increase in attacks on energy and automation systems has been noted [1] . Many infamous examples have been discovered, such as StuxNet, Industroyer and Black Energy. Technology (IT) security has not evolved as fast as the IIoT. While home and office appliances always had to combat attacks, industrial applications have been deemed secure due to two properties [2] : First, the industrial control, or Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA), system are physically separated from public networks. And second, the network properties are too unique for an attacker to effectively exploit them in case the perimeter was broken. The first property obviously falls to the paradigm of interconnectivity. As for the second one, Commercial Off The Shelve (COTS) products and standardised hard-and software have been introduced to industry as they have been into the consumer IoT market, decreasing customisation and configuration effort and increasing efficiency. This, however, enlarges attack surfaces and makes the implementation of reusable exploits possible. Thus, industrial IT security has become a major issue over the past years. Unlike home and office intrusion detection, however, security solutions are not as mature. Partly, this is due to the scarcity of data to test industrial Intrusion Detection System (IDS) applications on. As the communication patterns of industrial systems differ from home and officebased network traffic, the same IDS cannot be adapted for industrial application. Due to the characteristic nature of industrial network communication, time series analysis lends itself readily to the application. Time series analysis has been employed in many domains so far, e.g. in classic intrusion detection. In this work, three time series anomaly detection algorithms, Matrix Profiles, Seasonal Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (SARIMA)-and Long Short Term Memory (LSTM)-approach are evaluated on an industrial data set based on the Modbus/TCP protocol, a common and open source communication protocol for industrial applications.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: Section II gives an an overview of time series-based intrusion detection, as well as industrial intrusion detection. After that, the data set is introduced in Section III. In Sections IV, V and VI, three time series-based algorithms for anomaly detection are applied to the data set and the results are discussed respectively. This work is concluded in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK SCADA has been identified as a likely and promising target for cyber attackers [3] , [4] . Temporal properties as a feature for intrusion detection have been well-researched [5] , [6] . Different works discuss wavelet analysis of network data represented as a time series [7] , [8] . Furthermore, Wiener Filtering with Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA) modeling is evaluated by Celenk et al. [9] . K-means clustering of time series data is performed [10] , as well as statistical analysis of temporal distribution [11] , [12] . Furthermore, neural networks have been applied to industrial network intrusion detection. Filonov et al. propose LSTM-based intrusion detection on a synthetic data set that has been generated in their work [13] . Lin et al. analyse the time distribution of synthetic and real SCADA network data and identify deviations [14] . Linda et al. create an intrusion detection system based on neural networks [15] . In addition to neural networks, other techniques have been employed to detect attacks in industrial networks. State-based intrusion detection was evaluated by Goldenberg and Wool [16] , Fovino et al. [17] and Carcano et al [18] . Additionally, rule-, signature-and multiattribute-based intrusion detection systems have been evaluated [19] - [21] . Since Security Event and Information Management (SIEM)-systems are increasingly relevant for industrial intrusion detection, Oman et al. proposed a method to integrate intrusion detection into SIEM-systems for SCADA networks [22] . There are many works addressing the application of neural networks to intrusion detection for home and office networks [23] , [24] . Unfortunately, these works lack standardised data sets for evaluation. Often, the KDD Cup'99 data set [25] that has been proven to contain artifacts that lead to overfitting [26] is used. The data set we are analysing in this work [27] has been analysed on packet level by Duque Anton et al. [28] .
III. TIME SERIES DATA SET FOR INTRUSION DETECTION
Modbus is a communication protocol for industrial applications. It was developed by Gould Electronics Inc. that is now owned by Schneider Electric [29] . Modbus follows a Master/Slave concept. It has become a de-facto standard in industrial communication [30] . There are different flavours of the Modbus-protocol that are listed in Table I . Especially Lemay and Fernandez created a batch of Modbus/TCP data sets of an emulated industrial application [27] . They implemented a physical simulation model of electronic circuit breakers. This physical model was connected via a Modbus/TCP connection. It consisted of three to twelve software PLCs that were queried periodically by one or two Master Terminal Units (MTUs). Furthermore, aperiodic user behaviour was introduced as queries. After the traffic was recorded, exploits were introduced. These exploits were generated with the penetration testing tool metasploit [31] and are based on the TCP/IP layer. Unfortunately, no Modbus protocol-specific exploits have been performed. However, Lemay and Fernandez proposed a different batch of data where they used the lowest bits in the Modbus payload as a covert channel [27] .
In this work, three different data sets have been evaluated: ds1 is called "Moving two files Modbus 6RTU", ds2 is called "Send a fake command Modbus 6RTU with operate" and ds3 is called "CnC uploading exe modbus 6RTU with operate" in [27] . These data sets and their characteristics are listed in Table II . In this table, the number of packets in total is listed, the length of communication, as well as the number of malicious packets, the number of attacks defined as sequences of malicious packets. All data sets have polling intervals of 10 seconds. In contrast to ds2 and ds3, ds1 does not contain human interaction.
In this work, each second of network traffic has been aggregated as one data point, also called event. Features that are collected and evaluated are, among others, the number of protocols detected, the number of packets and bytes, the flags and function codes in a one-hot encoding. Due to preliminary analysis, three features are employed in the anomaly detection: the number of packets per second, the number of port pairs per second and the number of IP pairs per second.
IV. MATRIX PROFILES
Matrix Profiles are employed in order to detect time seriesbased anomalies in the data sets in this section. At first, the algorithm is introduced in Subsection IV-A. After that, the three data sets introduced above are evaluated in the following subsections. Finally, the performance of Matrix Profiles is discussed in Subsection IV-E.
A. Introduction to Matrix Profiles
The Matrix Profile algorithm is a method to calculate similarities in time series. It has been introduced by Yeh et al. in 2016 [32] . A sequence from a time series is compared to every other sequence of the same length within the time series. The distances are calculated and stored. This distance is a metric for similarity. If a sequence has a low minimal distance, a sequence with a related characteristic is present in the time series. If the minimal distance of a sequence is relatively high, it is unique in the time series. This property is suited to find outliers that can indicate attacks. The calculation of the z-normalised distance is described in (1) .
By employing Pearson's Correlation Coefficient [33] as shown in (2) corr(
where
and
By relating this with the Euclidean distance as shown in (5) [34] ,
the working formula for distance calculation is performed as described in (6) .
x and y are time series, µ is the respective mean and σ the respective standard deviation. m is the length of a sequence. In this work, m has been set to 10. Each data point represents the aggregated information of one second, the polling interval is 10 seconds. Matrix Profiles, however, are robust to changes in m, adaption of this parameter led to similar results as the ones discussed in the following subsections. There are several more efficient implementations of the distance calculation available such as Mueen's Algorithm for Similarity Search (MASS) [35] .
To obtain the Matrix Profile, each windowed sequence of length m is compared to each other sequence of length m in the time series. An interval of m 2 before and after the start of the sequence under observation is excluded, as this would result in a trivial match. A sequence x i has a distance of 0 from itself. After the distances are calculated, they are stored in a matrix. The minimum of of each column is stored, indicating the minimal distance of the given sequence from any other sequence. A slight change has been made to the algorithm as proposed in [32] : A windowed sequence is only compared to sequences that have already occurred, meaning only the distances of x i from all other x j with j ∈ {0, ..., (i − m 2 )} are calculated. In order to calculate the distances for early time points as well, two periods of 20 seconds' duration extracted from the end of ds1 were inserted into the beginning of all data sets. These two periods do not contain malicious or manual activity and can be considered as a training data set, where reference patterns are stored so as to prevent the first events of the investigated data from being penalised due to their early occurrence. A possible extension for Matrix Profiles could be the counting of similar instances in a data set. With the algorithm employed, each data set is checked with respect to having occurred before. Checking additionally how often it has occurred so far could help distinguish outliers that are seldom in comparison to regular events, e.g. in large traffic collections.
As the concept of distance is not easily mappable to formal metrics for classifier quality, no classic metric for classifier quality is employed in evaluating Matrix Profiles. Due to the length of the sliding window, the raise in distance is longer than the attack itself. This would falsify a metric in creating a large amount of false positives. Instead, a perfect threshold is calculated in a fashion that it is minimal, while still able to identify every attack.
B. Evaluation of ds1
The Matrix Profile of ds1 is depicted in Figure 1 . The curve describes the minimal distance of a sequence to any other, previously occuring, sequence. As shown in Table II ds1 contains four attacks in total, depicted by the series of dark gray dots. The attacks can be clearly distinguished by comparing the distance values to an ideal threshold, which is displayed by a solid line. Any feature is capable of indicating the attacks. The four increases in distance map to the beginning of the attacks. Only the first attack is detected with one second delay. This is due to the fact that it falls into a polling request perfectly, hardly altering the expected behaviour. Its second event, however, clearly indicates an attack. As Matrix Profiles employ a sequence length of m, 10 in this case, the distance value is raised for longer than the attack duration. This could be avoided by omiting anomalous values in the calculation of distance. Furthermore, it is shown that Matrix Profiles are capable of detecting attacks during the first second in which they occur, which is an important property for in-time detection. The increase of distance on the very end of the curves in Figure 1 is an artifact due to the data formatting.
C. Evaluation of ds2
As shown in Figure 2 , ds2 contains a lot of aperiodic traffic indicating anomalous events. Only one of them is malicious, marked by the dark gray dot. In this case, the number of 
D. Evaluation of ds3
Considering the fact that ds3 contains manual, aperiodic operations, the Matrix Profile approach works exceedingly well. The distances are shown in Figure 3 . Especially the numbers of packets and port pairs are capable of identifying attacks that are indicated by dark gray dots, if the perfect threshold, illustrated by the solid line, is employed. As discussed before, the rise in distance has a longer duration due to the length of the sliding window and the influence of anomalous events on the window. Still, Matrix Profiles are relatively robust to this, and the location of an attack can be detected easily as it is the first instance of a raised distance.
E. Discussion
Matrix Profiles are well suited to detect anomalies in data with periodic characteristics while tolerating a certain amount of noise. The predominant benefit is the ease of use as there is only one hyperparameter -m -to be defined. The algorithm is robust to changes in m so that fine-tuning is rarely necessary. Furthermore, efficient implementations of the distance calculation allow for in-time calculation of distances and therefore for real-time discovery of attacks. The choice of a threshold depends on the characteristics of a data set.
V. SARIMA APPROACH In this section we carry out a SARIMA approach for properly modelling and forecasting short-term future values of time series extracted from regular network traffic with periodical characteristics. Network intrusion can be identified by capturing data points that vary enough from the prediction.
A. Seasonal ARIMA-processes
A stochastic process {X t } t∈Z is called seasonal ARIMAprocess with period s and denoted by SARIM A(p, d, q) × (P, D, Q) s if {Y t } t∈Z with
is a stationary ARMA process of the form
where { t } t∈Z is the innovation process which is supposed to be white noise, i.e. a series of uncorrelated random variables with zero mean and finite variance σ 2 , U denotes the shift operator, i.e., U : X t → X t+1 , and A, F, D, G refer to the characteristic polynomials related to the ARM A-process, i.e.
( [37, Chap. 9.1.3]) We assume for simplicity that the innovation process { t } t∈Z is Gaussian white noise, i.e., t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) for all t ∈ Z.
B. Data adaptive model choice
We consider the three data sets introduced in Section III: ds1, ds2 and ds3. In order to apply asymptotic results from mathematical statistics, it is reasonable to use the normal part of the data without intrusion (i.e.,traffic labeled as "0") from the largest dataset (i.e.,with the longest duration) ds2 as longterm observation to model regular traffic. This also enables us to highlight the benefit of using the SARIMA approach for noisy data. The only intrusion in the aforementioned data set is injected during the time interval from the 289th to the 290th second without any effect on the subsequent traffic. We therefore choose the time series of data points obeserved from the 300th second to the 670th second of that data set for modelling the normal network behavior (training data). We then apply our forecast model to the remainder of available data (test data) for measuring prediction errors so as to identify attacks.
In order to bring out the effect of attack traffic and avoid recording too much noise, we capture the increase in the number of sent packets and the number of active IP and port pairs separately at one-second intervals (instead of smaller e.g. 10 ms or 100 ms intervals). From the large sample correlations between the above crucial features, namely corr(packet, port) = 0.9987, corr(port, IP) = 0.9922 and corr(packet, IP) = 0.9878 (regular traffic from ds2), we deduce strong linear dependency of them on one another. However, since the vast majority of the data is captured during normal system operation, it is not clear how meaningful these numbers are once the actual anomalies occur. In fact, it turns out that using the number of active port pairs for modeling and testing yields more accurate result on intrusion detection compared to using the other two features. This is due to the fact that, except for ds1, manual operations are included throughout the measurement which can cause considerable fluctuations in the number of packets and IP pairs leading to false positive results during intrusion detection, cf. Figure 4 -(a), -(b). In contrast, the port topology is in general not significantly affected by ordinary manual operations, cf. Figure 4-(c) , which provides us with a feature that is robust against this type of non-intrusion anomalies. In the sequel, we only present a detailed treatment of the time series of number of active port pairs per second which is denoted by {X t } t=1,...,N with First, aiming to confirm the periodical character induced by the predefined 10-seconds polling interval, we start our approach by analysing the autocorrelogram of the time series {X t } t=1,...,N , which is the plot of sample autocorrelations 
against lags τ = 0, 1, ..., N − 1, cf. Figure 5 . The sample autocorrelation oscillates with constant frequency of ten seconds, which indicates the existence of a periodical component with s = 10 in (8). In order to remove the heteroscedasticity of data in respect of state dependent variance and motivated by regression models with time series error terms [37, Chap. 9.5.1], we transform the original time series into a seasonally centered one {X t } t=1,...,N , that is, 
We then obtain possible choices of P and Q by considerinĝ π in the above manner provides possible choices of p and q, respectively. The choice of hyperparameters P, Q, p, q is not unique in general; a final decision among the possible candidates can be made, for instance, by means of the Akaike information criterion (AIC). Since our focus is not on delivering the best possible forecast but on detecting outliers and as these can also occur in early periods (cf. e.g. ds1), also doing so with the least possible amount of preceding data, we make a compromise of retaining accuracy and computational simplicity and accept the combination of orders (p = 4, q = 0) × (P = 1, Q = 0). Summing up, the above consideration leads to our choice of the model SARIM A(4, 0, 0) × (1, 0, 0) 10 for {Y t } t=1,...,N .
C. Parameter estimation
Since we have assumed the innovation { t } t to be Gaussian white noise, we use the least squares estimation which approximately delivers the asymptotically efficient maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters α := (α 1 , . . . , α p ), φ := (φ 1 , . . . , φ P ) and σ for SARIM A(p = 4, 0, 0) × (P = 1, 0, 0) 10 . The functional we are going to minimize reads as
It holds for the least squares estimate that (α,φ) = arg min
with p = 4, P = 1, s = 10. We solve the minimization problem numerically by means of a gradient descent procedure. The result of the above approximation is presented in Table III. We then obtain the one-step-ahead prediction of {Y t } t and the residuals { t (α,φ)} t in terms of (12, 13) . In a final step, let us verify that indeed our model is reasonable in the sense that the residuals t (α,φ), t = P s+p+1, . . . , N are white noise. To this end, we consider their sample autocorrelationsρ 1 
D. Intrusion detection
Having modelled the regular traffic, we now detect network intrusion as follows. For each test data set, we first transform the relevant time series {Z t } t into a seasonally centred one {Z t } t in the sense of (11) with fixed sample seasonal means obtained from the training data {X t } t . Then we apply the SARIM A(4, 0, 0) × (1, 0, 0) 10 model and the estimated coefficientsα,φ from Section V-C to the transformed test time series {Z t } t and compute the one-step prediction errors e Z t in terms of (12, 13) for t = P s + p + 1, P s + p + 2, . . .. Due to the different nature of the three test data sets in respect of manual operations, which belong to non-intrusion anomalies, we set individual thresholds for evaluating prediction errors in different data sets. For instance, since no manual operations are conducted in ds1, we can choose the 0.9995-quantile of N (0,σ 2 ) (= 1.05293) as threshold (corresponding to the confidence interval for a significance level of 0.001) for the absolute value of the prediction errors related to the number of port pairs in that data set. In contrast, more manual operations are observed in ds2 so that we set three times the 0.9995-quantile of N (0,σ 2 ) as threshold instead. As soon as the absolute prediction error |e Z t0 | exceeds the threshold at some time t 0 , the traffic related to that state Z t0 in the time series is classified as an intrusion. In order to prevent consequent errors, we also remove the detected attack traffic from the data immediately after detection, i.e., we replace the detected outlier Z t0 by the corresponding regular value before we continue the detection procedure for t > t 0 .
The final results of the above approach are summarised in Tables IV, V, VI. It turns out that, by chosing the proper threshold for each data set, all attack traffic can be accurately detected within one second while producing only a single false positive. 
E. Discussion
Overall, the main advantage of the SARIMA approach is that it is still powerful in the presence of noise. It also provides a parsimonious presentation of time series with periodical characteristics, using few parameters. However, it requires individual model adjustment each time dealing with a new time series.
VI. LONG SHORT TERM MEMORY
LSTM is a kind of neural network proposed by Hochreiter and Schmidhuber in 1997 to overcome the vanishing gradient problem [38] . This problem occurs when long-term dependencies are not considered accordingly by a recurrent neural network. The network "forgets" the events and cannot correlate dependencies. The concept of LSTM is presented in Subsection VI-A. After that, the evaluation of LSTM on the data sets is provided in Subsection VI-B, followed by a discussion of advantages and disadvantages in Subsection VI-C.
A. Introduction to LSTM
LSTM is a kind of neural network designed to keep information over long periods of time. Due to this ability, LSTM networks need the ability to reset parameters. This can be done with forget gates [39] . LSTM networks consist of cells that are interconnected. One such cell is depicted in Figure 6 . The representation of Olah is followed in this work [40] .
x t is the input, h t the output and C t the cell state at time step t. They are passed as inputs to the adjacent LSTM cell. W is a weight vector and b is a bias. Furthermore, there are the functions i t , f t and o t . They represent the update function, the forget function and the output function. To determine the values, activation functions are used. They are either the tangens hyperbolic (tanh) or the sigmoid function (σ). The forget value is calculated according to (14) . h t is derived from h t−1 and x t−1 , as are i t andC t . They are calculated according to (15) and (16) .
C t is an internal state used to calculate the cell state, as shown in (17) .
The output variable o t and the output gate h t are calculated according to (18) and (19) .
Four different parameterisations have been employed in this work: The length of input sequences has been set to 10 and 20, the number of layers has been set to 1 and 3. Furthermore, 400 neurons have been used. The training has been performed on the ds1 that has been stripped of malicious events using 20,000 iterations with a learning rate of 0.001 and batch sizes of 50. The LSTM networks have been used as predictors. They predicted the next event which was then compared to the actual event. In order to prevent consequent errors, the detected attack traffic was removed from the data immediately after detection before continuing the prediction process. All prediction errors were calculated as the absolute difference of predicted and actual value. After that, two threshold values were calculated. The first threshold was the minimal value, so that all malicious evens are above the threshold (MA). The second threshold was chosen so that all non-malicious events were below the threshold value (NM). Only the best performing set ups are presented in the following.
B. Evaluation of LSTM
After setting the threshold as discussed in the previous subsection, the true positives (t p ), false positives (f p ), true negatives (t n ) and false negatives (f n ) are calculated. They are used to calculate the F1-score (20) with precision (21) and recall (22) , as well as the accuracy (23) . These metrics were evaluated for each feature, packet count (PC), IP pairs (IP) and port pairs (PP) respectively. The performance of LSTM networks is presented in Table VII .
C. Discussion Table VII shows that the accuracy is always higher than the F1-score. This is due to the fact that t p as well as t n are considered in calculating the accuracy, while the F1-score puts an emphasis on t p . As shown in Table II , the malicious events are magnitudes smaller than the non-malicious ones. This is a common problem in anomaly detection, as an anomaly happens less frequently [41] . It leads to a negligible t p on the accuracy, most prevalently shown with ds2: The only attack was considered as non-malicious and thus a f n , but the accuracy according to (23) appears to be almost perfect. Nevertheless, LSTM performed relatively good analysing ds1 and ds3 considering some features.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, three algorithms for time series-based anomaly detection were evaluated on a synthetic data set containing network traffic of an industrial use case. They were analysed with respect to their capability in detecting attacks that were introduced to that data set, as well as the effort required to parameterise and train the algorithms.
The Matrix Profile approach performs very well in comparison. Most attacks can be found with few false positives. Furthermore, the parametrisation effort requires only one hyperparameter that is robust to change. Additionally, the training data set is small. There are some noteworthy extensions to Matrix Profiles, e.g. multidimensionality [42] and concepts for the integration of domain knowledge [43] , providing further applications to intrusion detection.
The SARIMA approach provides high forecasting accuracy and detection performance with few parameters. The theory of time series analysis from mathematical statistics provides a clearly defined procedure for the data adaptive model choice and the model adequacy check, e.g. the Ljung-Box test.
Despite the high computational effort for training a large number of parameters, the performance of LSTM network is less convincing than that of the other two algorithms. It strongly depends on the nature of the data. Over-or underfitting are important issues that have to be addressed. Furthermore, LSTM networks require the specification of many hyperparameters, e.g. number of layers, choice of activation function and learning rate, whose fine tuning is tedious and often depends on intuition and experience. That makes them unsuited for non-experts.
In summary, the time series-based anomaly detection methods discussed in this work are effective in detecting cyber attacks in industrial network traffic. Their efficiency could be improved by incorporating context information [36] such as authentication when operating manually, and sensible aggregation of this information [44] .
